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ANTITRUST: CLA.YTON ACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLTED BY
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT DocTRIm
In a treble damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act 1 plain-
tiffs contended that the running of the four-year statute of limitations of
section 4B 2 was tolled by defendants' fraudulent concealment of conspiracy.
Plaintiff relied on the federal courts' doctrine that statutes of limitations are
tolled by fraudulent concealment until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts upon which
he can base a cause of action.3 Defendants countered that damages sus-
tained more than four years before commencement of the suit were not
recoverable, because the legislative history of the Clayton Act indicated con-
gressional rejection of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The district
court 4 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissent-
ing, rejected defendants' contention and held that the fraudulent concealment
doctrine was controlling since its applicability was not expressly negatived
by Congress. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 83 Sup. Ct. 1298 (1963).
In Bailey v. Glover,5 an action to set aside conveyances in fraud of
creditors, the Supreme Court held that, in actions at law and in equitable
suits, a federal statute of limitations does not begin to run against a plain-
tiff who has been injured by fraud until, with proper diligence, he discovers
fraud that has been concealed or is of a self-concealing character.6 This
doctrine became so well-settled that the Supreme Court subsequently stated
in dictum that it was to be read into every statute of limitations applied by
lAny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained ....
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2 Any action to enforce any cause of action under section 4 or 4A shall be
forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action
accrued. No cause of action barred under existing law on the effective date
of this Act shall be revived by this Act.
69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1958).
3 See cases cited notes 5, 6, 9 infra.
4 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
588 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
6 Accord, Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 537 (1885); Rosenthal v. Walker, 111
U.S. 185, 190 (1884). Cf. Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918)
(six-year federal limitation period for cancelling land patents did not bar suit brought
after six years since the patents had allegedly been procured by fraud).
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a federal court to a federally created cause of action.7  Although prior to
the enactment of section 4B in 1955 no federal statute of limitations applied
to actions brought under section 4, federal courts referred to state statutes
of limitations and, when necessary, applied the Bailey doctrine.8 Since sec-
tion 4B has become applicable, numerous decisions, including those of all the
courts of appeals that have passed on the question, have read the doctrine
into section 4B; 9 four district courts, however, have held the doctrine inap-
plicable.'0
Although the Bailey doctrine would not be read into section 4B if Con-
gress had clearly manifested a contrary intent,". there is no clear manifesta-
tion of such intent in the legislative history of Section 4B. Antitrust de-
fendants have argued that rejection by the congressional committee of ex-
plicit provisions similar to the Bailey doctrine 2 constitutes a rejection of
7 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946). Some courts, however,
have held that the plain meaning of a statute of limitations providing that the cause
of action shall be forever barred after a stated period precludes the application of
the fraudulent concealment doctrine. United States v. Borin, 209 F.2d 145, 147-48
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954) ; United States ex rel. Nitkey v. Dawes,
151 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946).
8 See, e.g., Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961) (pre-4B cause of action); Crummer Co. v. Du
Pont, 255 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958) (pre-4B cause of
action). In addition some courts utilized state tolling doctrines. See, e.g., Foster
& Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742, 752 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 613 (1936).
9 Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 912 (1962); Department of Water & Power v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
213 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Public Serv. Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., Civil
No. 7349, D. Colo., Sept. 11, 1962; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 210 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; United States v. General Elec. Co., 209
F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
'ORinzler v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 214 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ga. 1962);
Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 574 (D. Utah 1962); Public
Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 4924, D.N.M., July 25, 1962; Kansas City v.
Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 545 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd, 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962).
"See Note, 72 YA.Ex L.. 600, 606 (1963).
12 For a discussion of whether the rejected provisions are sufficiently similar to
the Bailey doctrine to suggest the inference that rejection of the provisions amounted
to rejection of the doctrine see notes 17-26 infra and accompanying text.
The rejected provisions are S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 7905,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. 1986, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). Extended
hearings were conducted in 1950 on a bill permitting a treble damage action "within
six years after the plaintiff discovered (or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered) the facts relied upon for proof of the conspiracy ... .
H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1950). See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 7905 Before a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
14, pt. 5, at 89 (statement of the United States Chamber of Commerce), 92 (statement
of the Association of the Bar of City of New York), 95 (statement of the American
Bar Assoication) (1950). The House Committee took no action upon H.R. 7905
stpra and favorably reported a bill providing:
Any action (including an action brought by or on behalf of the United States)
to enforce any cause of action under this section shall be forever barred un-
less commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued.
H.R. 8763, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). H.R. Rha. No. 2467, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950) stressed that the above bill rejected the discovery philosophy of H.R. 7905
supra. Similarly, after rejecting H.R. 1986 .mipra, the Committee favorably reported
H.R. 3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) which resembled H.R. 8763 quoted above.
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the doctrine. 13 This argument requires that courts give weight to con-
gressional rejection of proposed legislation as indicating an intent to over-
rule judicial precedent,14 but the action of Congress may indicate mere
inertia or a desire to leave the decision to the courts. Rejection of tolling
provisions by the House Committee on the Judiciary may have meant no
more than that the Committee, because of already substantial opposition to
the proposed bills,15 was not willing to assume responsibility for codifying
the tolling doctrine in legislation.' 6 Since a committee desiring to overrule
a judicial precedent can so state in a committee report, there is great danger
of attaching unwarranted significance to rejection of similar legislation,
when the motivation for rejection is unclear. The committee reports on
section 4B neither advert to the fraudulent concealment doctrine 17 nor ar-
ticulate the reasons for rejection of the similar tolling provisions.
Even if a court were willing to attach weight to the committee rejection,
the rejected provisions are not sufficiently similar to the fraudulent con-
cealment doctrine to support an inference that rejection of the provisions
was tantamount to rejection of the Bailey doctrine. The dissimilarities are
such that the proposed bills may have been more objectionable to business
interests than the Bailey doctrine, and rejection of the proposed bills did not
necessarily represent rejection of the doctrine. The proposed bills referred
to the discovery of "facts relied upon for proof of the conspiracy" 'S to
start the limitation period, while the statute of limitations commences, under
the Bailey doctrine, when a plaintiff discovers that he has been injured by
a conspiracy. 19 As a result, plaintiffs have less time within which to bring
suit and their suits pose less of a threat under the Bailey doctrine than under
the rejected provisions. Moreover, under the doctrine, it is at least rela-
tively clear what facts, when discovered, will start the limitation period
running.20 In contrast, at the hearings on the proposed bills, objection was
13 See, e.g., instant case at 240 & n.9; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 210 F. Supp. 557, 561-62 (N.D. Ill. 1962). See generally Note, 72 YALE
L.J. 600, 607-09 (1963).
14 Some courts give no weight to unexplained rejections of proposed bills. See
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (decision in accord with bills rejected
by a congressional committee); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 44 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); MISHKIN & MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 309 (1961).
15 See authorities cited note 13 mtpra.
16 Enactment of a statute of limitations barring all action after four years does
not indicate a rejection of the Bailey doctrine since limitations statutes are generally
drafted in such terms and courts have consistently read the doctrine into them. See
notes 5-7 sipra.
17 The Senate Committee Report expressed concern about each of the following:
permitting actions upon stale claims when evidence to refute them may no longer
be available, impairing efficient business operations, and overburdening court calendars
with actions seeking to prove damages incurred over a period longer than four years.
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). However, the Committee was merely
explaining why it cut the limitation period from the proposed six years to four years.
Reasons for requiring a plaintiff who has discovered a conspiracy to bring action
promptly do not require that a plaintiff whose cause of action is concealed be barred
from bringing action before he could know that a cause of action existed.
18 See note 12 supra.
19 See, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
20 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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made that it would be difficult to tell when sufficient facts had been dis-
covered. 21 The rejected provisions may also have differed from the fraudu-
lent concealment doctrine in that the doctrine requires proof of a self-con-
cealing conspiracy 2 2 or of affirmative acts of concealment 2 while the re-
jected provisions may have had no requirement of affirmative acts.24 To
the business interests represented in Congress, 25 the Bailey doctrine, placing
upon a plaintiff the onerous burden of adducing proof of a self-concealing
conspiracy 26 or of affirmative acts of concealment 2 7 in order to toll the stat-
ute of limitations, was less objectionable than a bill which did not clearly
require proof of affirmative acts of concealment.
Although there was no clear rejection of the Bailey doctrine, there also
was no clear indication that Congress intended it to be applied to section 4B.
Courts have given varying weight to a statement on the floor of the House
by Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary and floor manager of section 4B, that the bill was not intended to
change existing law on tolling in cases of fraud and conspiracy, and that in
such cases "the statute of limitations runs from the time of discovery." 28
Several courts apparently considered that the statement showed an intent
of Congress that the fraudulent concealment doctrine be applicable.29 How-
ever, Celler merely stated that his Committee had no intent to change exist-
ing law and then gave his personal conception of existing law2 0 Perhaps
the Committee had not even considered tolling in conspiracy cases since a
leading member of the Committee stated that he was unsure of the existing
law on tolling.31 Celler's statement should be given little, if any, weight to
21 Do "the facts" mean all the facts? Do the words "relied upon" mean
the facts necessary to establish the existence of the conspiracy or merely
such evidence as may be relied upon by the plaintiff in his good judgment
as relevant and material?
Testimony of Milton Handler, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
14, pt 5, at 21-22 (1950).
2 2 Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874); American Tobacco Co.
v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 Fed. 58, 60 (5th Cir. 1913). 'Self concealment' of a
conspiracy sufficient to toll the statute of limitations refers to activities in further-
ance of the conspiracy which by their nature defy detection." Gaetzi v. Carling
Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
23 Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894); Gaetzi v. Carling Brewery Co., supra
note 22; Dovberg v. Dow Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
24 No such requirement was included in the text of the bills, see authorities cited
note 13 supra, nor does one appear to have been discussed.
25 See notes 13 and 16 supra and accompanying text.
26 See note 22 supra.
27 See note 23 supra.
28 101 CoNG. REc. 5132 (1955).
29 See, e.g., Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 279 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962) ; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 210 F. Supp. 557, 558, 561-62 (1962).
30 There were few congressmen present when Representative Celler made his
remark. See 101 CONG. Rxc. 5128 (1955) (single record vote showed only 46 mem-
bers voting). Absent members probably did not read the record for that day since
it had been agreed that no controversial matters would then be considered. See id.
at 5129.
31 Statement of Representative Keating, 101 CONG. REc. 5130 (1955).
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show an affirmative congressional intent that the Bailey doctrine be applied
to section 43. The statement indicates at most an understanding of the
Committee that it did not intend to change existing law-whatever it was.
Since Congress manifested no intent about the Bailey doctrine, courts
need decide merely whether factors peculiar to antitrust conspiracies make
the doctrine inapplicable.32 Most recent decisions, in applying Bailey, have
apparently recognized that the arguments on inapplicability are based upon
policy considerations traditionally dealt with only by legislatures and not by
courts.3 3 It is, therefore, safe to assume that the Bailey doctrine will be
consistently applied to section 43.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-STATE'S DETERMINATION OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION OVER BORDER LAND IS OPEN TO COLLATERAL
ATTACK IN BORDERING STATE
N brought an action in the Nebraska state courts to quiet title to land
situated in the Missouri River bottoms close to the Nebraska-Missouri
boundary line.' N's title was based on a Nebraska tax sale deed. M, who
had possession of the land and a title derived from a swamp patent issued
by Missouri, appeared generally in the action and challenged the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter, alleging that the land was located in
Missouri. The trial court found that the land was in Nebraska and quieted
title in N. After a trial de novo, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
32 See Note, 49 VA. L. Rav. 276, 308-12 (1963). Treble damage suits have fre-
quently been considered penal. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426 (1955) ; Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) ; Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 14, pt. 5, at 45 (1950). An issue not
often considered is the effect of the penal nature of treble damage suits upon the
applicability of the equitable Bailey doctrine. Courts traditionally refuse to apply
equitable doctrines to enforce suits in the nature of penalties. See Marshall v.
Vicksburg, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 146, 149 (1872); Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 447, 455 (1854). However, there is a growing tendency to apply equi-
table doctrines in areas in which they were traditionally inapplicable. See Glus v.
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959).
33 Congress might decide that the number of actions that, after discovery of a
conspiracy, could be based upon transactions occurring within the preceding four
years are an adequate supplement to government actions, but this is not a judgment
for the courts. Nevertheless, some judges have had doubts about the capacity of
the court system to apply the fraudulent concealment doctrine in 1800 actions against
electrical manufacturers. The judges have recognized the necessity of lengthy trials
because of the difficulty of proving affirmative acts of concealment by the defendants
or self-concealment, as well as due diligence of the plaintiff, at times frequently as
far back as twenty years. See Brigham City Corp. v. General Electric Co., 210 F.
Supp. 574, 577-78 (D. Utah 1962) ; Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 210 F.
Supp. 545, 551 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd 310 F. 2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
912 (1962). If a court were to deal with policy considerations on this question, it
would have to consider such factors as the expense-regardless of legal liability-of
defending against actions frequently based upon innumerable transactions annually
recurring over a fifteen- or twenty-year period.
1 The boundary between Missouri and Nebraska is the middle of the main channel
of the Missouri River. Instant case at 210.
2 Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959). The issue of juris-
diction was primarily one of fact and was determinative of the controversy. Since
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M then instituted an action in the Missouri courts to quiet title to the same
land. N removed this action to the federal district court, which dismissed
the action on the ground that the Nebraska judgment was res judicata. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that since the
Nebraska judgment indirectly affected Missouri's alleged sovereign interest
in the land, it was "not unreasonable or improper" for the district court in
Missouri to "satisfy itself as to the first forum's subject-matter jurisdic-
tion." 3 Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 371
U.S. 946 (1963).
Although the Supreme Court at first did not view the full faith and
credit clause 4 as barring reexamination by one state of another state's
jurisdictional determinations, 5 the practical need for an end to litigation of
the same issues between the same parties 6 has induced the Court to make
the land was originally on the Nebraska side of the river, the court's finding that
the land was still in Nebraska automatically determined that N was the rightful
owner because his title was based on a Nebraska tax deed. Thus, Missouri, never
having had dominion over the land, could not have conveyed any interest to M via
its land patent. Id. at 280-81, 95 N.W.2d at 624-25. The location of the boundary
between the two states was set by determining whether the Missouri River had
changed its course by the process of avulsion or accretion. When a river suddenly
abandons its old course and seeks a new channel (avulsion), there is no change in
the boundary; the boundary remains in the middle of the old channel. If, however,
a river changes its channel gradually by alluvial formations (accretion), the boundary
moves with the river. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892).
3 Instant case at 220.
4 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. Federal courts must
give full faith and credit to state court judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958), Huron
Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 (1941) (dictum).
5 If it was determined that the first forum did not have jurisdiction, the judg-
ment was considered a nullity. The leading case is Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 457 (1874); there the Court, quoting Chancellor Kent, declared:
"[I]n all instances the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment may
be inquired into . . . . It is only when the jurisdiction of the court in
another State is not impeached, either as to the subject-matter or the person,
that the record of the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. The
court must have had jurisdiction not only of the cause, but of the parties,
and in that case the judgment is final and conclusive."
Id. at 463.
See Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901) ; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
165 (1850). See generally EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws § 57, at 207-09 (1962) ;
Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term, 1939, 40
COLUM. L. Rtv. 1006 (1940); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause
of the Constitutim, 45 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1945) ; Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Collateral Attack of Juirsdictional Issues, 36 GFo. LJ. 154 (1948).
6 The rationale for the doctrine of res judicata was given in Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938):
Courts to determine the rights of parties are an integral part of our
system of government. It is just as important that there should be a place
to end as that there should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has
his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of
the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered
merely retries the issue previously determined. There is no reason to expect
that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the first.
As to the practical need, see ARNOLD & JAMEs, CASES ON TRIALs, JUDGmENTs &
APPEA.s 133-36 (1936).
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local principles of res judicata, even as to jurisdictional issues, "a part of
[our] national jurisprudence." 7 The considerations against allowing a
foreign forum's allegedly erroneous jurisdictional determination to stand
must now be balanced against the weighty considerations underlying res
judicata.8 Collateral attack will rarely be permitted even when jurisdic-
tional issues were not previously litigated if the parties appeared generally
and had full opportunity to raise such issues.9 But, when important con-
gressional policies are involved, the Court has developed a narrow exception
to the rule and allowed inquiry into the first forum's jurisdiction over the
subject matter.' 0 As yet, however, it has not deemed state policy consid-
erations sufficient to justify a collateral attack on a sister state court's deter-
mination of subject matter jurisdiction if that court had jurisdiction over the
parties, although it has conceded that there could be such cases."
The court in the present case summarily disposed of the full faith and
credit issue, reasoning that a second forum may always inquire into the first
forum's jurisdictional determinations and, therefore, that only a question of
federal res judicata law was posed.' 2 Not only does this decision appear
incorrect,13 but it may have been unnecessary, for either of two reasons. If,
7 Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942). The Court has
barred collateral attack in the following cases: Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948) (subject matter jurisdiction-full faith and credit); Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (subject matter jurisdiction-res judicata) ;
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) (subject matter jurisdiction-full
faith and credit); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938) (subject matter jurisdiction
-full faith and credit); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938) (subject matter
jurisdiction-res judicata); American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932)
(personal jurisdiction-full faith and credit); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931) (personal jurisdiction-res judicata).
8 Policy considerations in favor of allowing collateral attack outweighed the
policy underlying res judicata in United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
309 U.S. 506 (1940) (sovereign immunity), and Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433
(1940) (Congress' plenary power over bankruptcy); see Rashid, supra note 5, at
171-74. Compare Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930) (state and
federal concurrent jurisdiction over interstate commerce), and Vallely v. Northern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) (Congress' plenary power over bank-
ruptcy), in which strong policy considerations were present and collateral attack
was allowed. However, in both cases the Court was still applying the old theory
that the jurisdiction of a foreign forum could always be questioned. Neither in
Kalb nor in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. were the jurisdictional issues actually
litigated in the first forum, but it seems unlikely, in light of the strong policy con-
siderations, that prior litigation of these issues would have led to different results.
9 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940);
see Rashid, supra note 5, at 165-71. The Chicot principle was reaffirmed in Heiser
v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 735-36 (1946).
I' See note 8 supra. But see Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494 (1941).
11 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948) (dictum). But cf. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Riley v. New York Trust Co.,
315 U.S. 343 (1942). In Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 30 (1917),
Mr. Justice Holmes stated that if a forum's determination as to jurisdiction is so
gross a mistake "as to be impossible in a rational administration of justice," other
forums need not give the judgment full faith and credit.
12 Instant case at 212.
13 See text accompanying notes 4-11 supra.
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as the court seems to have assumed, 14 the case was merely a diversity action
in a federal court, the court should first have looked to the law of Missouri
to ascertain if that state would give effect to the Nebraska judgment without
the compulsion of the full faith and credit clause.' 5 Although there is no
Missouri law precisely on point, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that
once an issue of personal jurisdiction over a Missouri corporation has been
litigated in a sister state, it cannot be relitigated in the Missouri courts.' 6
However, the present case is not merely a diversity action. The loca-
tion of an interstate boundary and the adjudication of disputes between
parties claiming land under conflicting grants from different states are mat-
ters of federal concern.17 Since it would be inappropriate to apply one
state's law in preference to that of the other, federal common law, not state
law, should provide the rules for decision,' 8 both as to the principal substan-
14 See instant case at 212, where the court declares:
Thus, there is no full faith and credit requirement that, in the case before
us, a Missouri court-and thereby the federal district court in Missouri, see
Angel v. Bullington, [330 U.S. 183 (1947)] . . . -must accept the Nebraska
judgment as final.
15 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co., 316 Mo. 812, 293 S.W. 760 (1927) (alternative
holding). The case involved a New York court's determination that it had personal
jurisdiction over a Missouri corporation which had specially appeared to contest
jurisdiction. In barring collateral attack in the Missouri courts, the Missouri Supreme
Court alternatively relied on the full faith and credit clause and on Missouri res
judicata law. Undoubtedly Missouri's sovereign interest in the property involved
in the present case is stronger than any interest it had in protecting the Missouri
corporation in Hall. Nevertheless a federal court applying state law in a diversity
suit is more restricted in its application of that law than the state supreme court,
and thus, if it were presented with the factual situation in the instant case, it would
probably regard the Hall case as highly persuasive authority and therefore not reach
the constitutional issue.
If there is no state law on the issue of collateral attack, the Supreme Court has
indicated that it is appropriate to follow the federal res judicata law. Treinies v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 n.26 (1939).
17In Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289 (1918), the state sought to enjoin Cissna,
a private party, from removing timber from certain lands which were originally
part of the Mississippi River bed. Cissna challenged the Tennessee court's jurisdiction
on the ground that the land was in Arkansas. The court found the land to be in
Tennessee and gave judgment for the state. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court declared that a correct application of
the law of interstate boundaries was necessary "in order that proper effect . . . be
given to the treaties and acts of Congress by which [the Mississippi River] . . . was
established as an interstate boundary, and hence this is a question of federal law."
Id. at 296. It concluded that the Tennessee court had wrongly applied the boundary
law.
18 Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) ; Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). It should be noted that the Constitution pro-
vides that "the judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States
. " U.S. CoNsT. art. III,§ 2. Hamilton's comments on this provision indicate
more than a concern for an impartial tribunal but, in addition, a concern for an
impartial law:
The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which
the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No
man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect
to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle* has no inconsider-
able weight in designating the federal courts as the proper tribunals for the
determination of controversies between different states and their citizens.
1963]
1222 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111
tive issue and to ancillary matters, such as res judicata. 19 On this view of
the case, the question of allowing collateral attack on the Nebraska judg-
ment is primarily one of federal res judicata law and only secondarily one
of full faith and credit. Stated differently, the federal court in Missouri
should first have decided as a matter of federal common law whether it
should give res judicata effect to the Nebraska judgment. Only if that issue
was resolved in favor of allowing a collateral attack would the court have
had to decide whether the federal statute 20 implementing the full faith and
credit clause compelled it to give effect to the Nebraska judgment.21  The
court's reliance on federal res juicata law appears, therefore, to have been
correct although its reasons for so doing may have been erroneous.
As a problem of res judicata, the present case involves a balancing of
the policy considerations in favor of allowing the federal court in Missouri
to inquire into the Nebraska court's jurisdictional determination against the
almost conclusive policy underlying the finality of judgments.2 In striking
this balance, Supreme Court decisions, as synthesized by the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws,23 have deemed it relevant that
the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear; . . .
the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of
law rather than of fact; . . . the court was one of limited and
And it ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between
citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants of different States,
founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are of this description. The
courts of neither of the granting States could be expected to be unbiased.
The laws may have even prejudged the question, and tied the courts down
to decisions in favor of the grants of the State to which they belonged.
The Federalist No. 80, at 115 (Dunne ed. 1901) (Hamilton). (Emphasis added.)
19 Even though federal law provides the rules for decision, diversity was the
basis of jurisdiction in the present case. Section 1331 of the Judicial Code provides
that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1958). However, in an action to quiet
title, "it is not necessary for the plaintiff to do more than allege his own title and
that the defendant claims adversely to him. The nature of the adverse claim, and
source and manner from and in which it originated, are immaterial." Marshall v.
Desert Properties Co., 103 F.2d 551, 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 563
(1939). In the present case, M's claim derives not from a federal treaty, statute,
or the Constitution, but merely from a Missouri swamp patent and Missouri property
law. It seems unlikely, therefore, that M would have been able to establish district
court jurisdiction in her "well-pleaded" complaint. On the "well-pleaded" complaint
rule for establishing district court jurisdiction, see Mishkin, The Federal "Question"
in the District Courts, 53 CoLuIm. L. REv. 157, 164, 176-77 (1953).
If M and N had been citizens of the same state claiming under land grants from
different states, 28 U.S.C. § 1354 (1958), implementing U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2,
would have conferred jurisdiction on the district court in Missouri.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
2
1 Federal courts are not bound by the clause itself, but only by the statute. See
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1938).
Admittedly, the analysis of the present case would be basically the same, whether
the case is viewed in res judicata or full faith and credit terms. As a matter of
judicial process, however, it seems preferable for a court to decide whether it would
-as a matter of common law-give effect to a judgment before it decides whether
a federal statute compels it to do so.
2 2 See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
23 See instant case at 217-18.
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not of general jurisdiction; . . . the question of jurisdiction was
not actually litigated; . . . [and] the policy against the court's
acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.24
The Court of Appeals decided that the present case was controlled by
the last of these factors-that "the policy against the court's acting beyond
its jurisdiction is strong." 2 It indicated that the Nebraska judgment would
affect, although only indirectly, Missouri's sovereignty, the validity of its
land titles, and its power to tax 2 6  Of these interests, the latter two-the
validity of Missouri's land titles and its power to tax the disputed land-
are merely adjuncts of the first-sovereignty. Concededly, sovereignty over
its territory is important to each state, but here neither state has clear do-
minion over the land in question. As the Supreme Court has said in an-
other context, 'this is . . . a case involving inconsistent assertions of
power by courts of two States of the Federal Union and thus presents con-
siderations which go beyond the interests of local policy, however vital." 27
If Missouri were to do nothing, its alleged sovereign interest could be im-
paired by the Nebraska judgment. However, as between the two states, the
Nebraska judgment is not determinative of the boundary issue; 28 Missouri
can bring an original action in the Supreme Court to determine in which
jurisdiction the land is located.29  Since Missouri has this constitutionally
provided procedure to protect its interests, it is difficult to understand why
Missouri's interest should avail M, who fully litigated the jurisdictional
issue in the Nebraska district court, obtained a trial de novo in the Nebraska
Supreme Court, and could have sought certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. 0
The court placed considerable stress on the notion that a state's real
property is traditionally immune "from direct disposition by a sister state's
judgment," 81 but failed to explore the reason for the rule. Apart from tra-
dition, 2 this immunity is based on practical considerations which dictate
2 4
RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT oF LAws §451(2) (Supp. 1948); accord, RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
25 Instant case at 218-19.
26Id. at 220.
27 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354 (1948).
28 See New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 1 (1799) ; Fowler v. Lindsey,
3 U.S. (Dall.) 411 (1799); cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
2 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. It must be admitted that such an action in the
Supreme Court might prove lengthy and costly. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction
of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. RE:. 665, 695 (1959). It would,
however, determine the boundary not only as to the property involved in the present
case but also as to property located down the river. The fact that the shifting of
the river may have affected downstream property argues for one determination of
the boundary issue which will be binding in all future private party suits.
30 In a petition for certiorari, M might have claimed that because of the Nebraska
court's alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, her property had been taken with-
out due process.
21 See instant case at 219.
32 See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1909); Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdictiow, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 943 (1960).
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that litigation concerning titles to land generally ought to be held in the
jurisdiction where the land is situated: records dealing with the property
will be readily available, most witnesses will be living in the same general
area, the premises can be viewed easily, employees in the title office if
needed to testify at the trial will not be detained for extended periods of
time, and the local courts will be familiar with the recording procedure and
the state's land title law. In the present case, these considerations as well as
the traditional notion of a sovereign's unique "physical power" over the land
balance evenly no matter in which state the trial is held because it is not
clear in which jurisdiction the land lies.
In addition, the present case is distinguishable from the few recent cases
in which the Supreme Court has allowed collateral attack on determinations
of subject matter jurisdiction. This has only occurred when an important
congressional policy would have been thwarted by the earlier decision. In
Kalb v. Feuerstein,- congressional policy with respect to bankruptcy was
involved. The Court there stated that
Congress, because its power over the subject of bankruptcy is
plenary, may by specific bankruptcy legislation . . . render judi-
cial acts taken with respect to the person or property of a debtor
whom the bankruptcy law protects nullities and vulnerable col-
laterally.3
4
In United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,3 5 if collateral at-
tack had not been permitted liability would have been imposed on Indian
tribes that supposedly had sovereign immunity from suit. In contrast, Mis-
souri's sovereign interest in the present case is neither directly nor conclu-
sively impaired by the Nebraska judgment.3 6
Significantly, the Supreme Court has recently cast considerable doubt
on the correctness of earlier dicta that res judicata may not apply to foreign
judgments involving status or land titles3 7 Despite the old theory that the
domiciliary state was an integral partner in the marriage contract, which
could not be rescinded without the state's permission, 5 the Court held in
Sherrer v. Sherrer 4 9 that if the parties have appeared in a divorce proceed-
ing in a sister state and if there was a determination of the bona fide resi-
dency of the spouse seeking the divorce, all states must honor that determi-
nation.40 It thought that the policy underlying res judicata and thereby full
3308 U.S. 433 (1940).
34 Id. at 438-39.
35 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
36 See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
37 United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940)
(dictum)_; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 176 (1938) (dictum).
28 See Note, 1947-48 Term of the Supreme Court: Interstate Status of Divorce,
48 CoLum. L. REv. 1083 (1948), and authorities there cited.
39 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
4 0 However, the judgment must be given full faith and credit only if it is not
subject to collateral attack in the state that rendered it.
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faith and credit, outweighed the domiciliary state's interests. "There is
nothing in the concept of due process which demands that a defendant be
afforded a second opportunity to litigate the existence of jurisdictional
facts." 41 Sherrer is demonstrative of the Court's tendency to extend the
full faith and credit principle. Notwithstanding that a state's interest in its
land may be more substantial than its interest in the marital status of its
domiciliaries, the present case stands in a better posture for precluding col-
lateral attack, for in Sherrer the governmental interest was foreclosed by the
out-of-state litigation.
As between the litigants, there is no reason to retry the case in the
Missouri federal courts. No assertion was made that the Nebraska courts
rendered an unfair judgment. If M feared prejudice, she could have re-
moved the action to the federal district courts. 42 The federal court in Mis-
souri can add nothing but another independent conclusion on the question
of fact which is determinative of both the jurisdictional issue and the case
on its merits: did the Missouri River change its course suddenly or gradu-
ally ?43 Consequently, little is gained from the present decision. However,
something of value is lost; the decision, in addition to sanctioning repeated
trials of a factual issue, leads to confusion and disrespect for the judicial
process 44 by creating practical problems as to the binding effect of each
judgment. There is some authority that if a second forum erroneously fails
to give full faith and credit to a prior jurisdictional determination, the erro-
neous resolution of the full faith and credit issue will nonetheless be res
judicata in a collateral attack on the second judgment,45 and thus the second
decision supersedes the first. But the court's conclusion in the present case
that each affected state can make an independent evaluation of the jurisdic-
tional question seems to argue against binding N by the Missouri judgment.
Under its analysis, if the Missouri trial court should give judgment for M,
there is no reason why a Nebraska court, in a subsequent collateral attack
by N, should give that Missouri judgment res judicata effect; if Missouri's
41 Id. at 348.
42 See 28 U.S.C. §1331(a), 1332(a), 1441(a) (1958).
43 See instant case at 211. On the avulsion-accretion distinction, see note 2 supra.
4 4 In a similar case, Iselin v. La, Coste, 55 F. Supp. 977, 980 (W.D. La. 1944),
the district court judge said in a somewhat facetious manner:
If litigation over the same property can thus be carried on successfully in
two federal courts, in different states, contiguous to the river, where the
island is claimed to have been formed, it would seem that if it had happened
that the location had been in, say, the Red River, adjacent to where three
states, Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana, join, it would have been possible
for the plaintiffs to invoke the decisions of three 'separate federal courts on
the same chain of title ....
He concluded that the prior judgment was res judicata. In affirming, the Fifth
Circuit continued in the same facetious vein by saying, "we are, therefore, now con-
fronted with the vagaries of the river as well as the vagaries of counsel for Plaintiffs."
Iselin v. La Coste, 147 F._d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1945).
45 See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); United States v.
171.74 Acres of Land, 206 F. Supp. 322 (D. Neb. 1962); RESTATmENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 42 (1942); cf. Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.-d 641
(Sup. Ct. 1952) (inconsistent judgments of courts of two foreign countries).
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sovereign interest was sufficient to warrant reopening the prior jurisdic-
tional determination, so is Nebraska's. Moreover, this analysis would au-
thorize a third state having an interest in the land to make a third deter-
mination, which presumably would not supersede the first two. Experience
dictates that the practical procedure is appellate review, not collateral attack.
DEPORTATION-DENIAL OF SUsPENsioN HELD NOT A FINAL
ORDER DIRECTLY REvIEwABLE BY CouRT OF APPEALS UNDER SEC-
TION 106(a) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
Following the institution of deportation proceedings under section
242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,' a resident alien conceded
his deportability, but sought relief from the Attorney General, who has dis-
cretion to suspend deportation in a defined class of cases and to adjust a
deportable alien's status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence when deportation would "result in exceptional and extremely un-
usual hardship." 2 The Attorney General, through his special inquiry officer,
denied suspension, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The
alien then sought judicial review of this denial under section 106(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which grants the courts of appeals exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review "all final orders of deportation . . under sec-
tion 242(b) . . . ." 3 Although both the alien and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service urged the court to assume jurisdiction, the Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, held, four judges dissenting, that it lacked jurisdic-
tion because the denial of suspension was not a "final order of deporta-
tion." 4 Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 947 (1963).
The Attorney General, by administrative regulation, has delegated his
power to suspend deportation to the special inquiry officer who holds the
242(b) hearing on deportability. Therefore, suspension and deportability
are determined by the same officer at the same hearing. Although these
166 Stat. 209 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958).2 The suspension powers of the Attorney General are set forth in Immigration
and Nationality Act § 244, 66 Stat. 214 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (Supp.
1963).
375 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. §1105a(a) (Supp. III, 1962).
4 When the case was first heard by the Second Circuit, a three-judge panel held,
2 to 1, that the denial of suspension was "a final order of deportation." One of the
judges constituting the majority of the panel was Senior Judge Hincks, who, as a
retired judge, was ineligible to sit in the en banc proceedings. Instant case at 789
(dissenting opinion); see United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S.
685 (1960). Thus, if Judge Hincks is included, the judges of the Second Circuit
who considered the issue were equally divided, 5 to 5.
5 See 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (Supp. 1963). Section 241 of the act sets forth the various
grounds for deportation. 66 Stat. 204 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp.
III, 1962).6 See GoRnoN & RoSENFzLD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 5.7a, at 540-
41 (1962).
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rulings were at first reviewable only by habeas corpus, 7 the Supreme Court
later held that review by declaratory judgment in the district court was also
available." Consequently, an alien could obtain a declaratory judgment, ap-
peal to the court of appeals, and seek further review in the Supreme Court
via certiorari. In addition, when he was thereafter taken into custody prior
to his actual deportation, he could once more test both rulings by habeas
corpus in the district court with the same right of appellate review.9 This
procedure permitted aliens who had sufficient money and persistence to delay
deportation for several years even though they had little hope of eventually
winning on the merits."' As part of an effort to combat such dilatory
tactics," Congress, by its enactment in 1961 of section 106(a), granted the
courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review "all final orders of depor-
tation . . . made against aliens . . . pursuant to administrative pro-
ceedings under section 242(b) .... ,, 12 Although section 106 (a) un-
questionably applies to the actual ruling on deportability,13 the courts have
disagreed on its applicability to denials of suspension and other forms of
discretionary relief.' 4
T Heikldla v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953) ; 104 CONG. REC. 17172 (1958) (remarks
of Representative Walter); AUEREAcH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
446-47 (2d ed. 1961); GORDON & ROSENFIELD, op. cit. .ipra note 6, § 8.3, at 812-14.
8 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955), construing Administrative Pro-
cedure Act § 10, 60 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). On habeas corpus,
review of discretionary rulings, such as denials of suspension, is limited to the question
of whether the ruling is so arbitrary as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaugh-
nessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950). The scope of review is similarly confined when
a declaratory judgment is sought. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956)
(exclusion case); Cruz-Sanchez v. Robinson, 249 F.2d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1957)
(deportation case); United States ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840 (7th
Cir. 1955) (deportation case) ; GORDON & RosEN=nD, op. cit. supra note 6, §8.11a,
at 847-48.
9 E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1961); AUERRACH, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 447.
30 H.R. REP. No. 1086, supra note 9, at 23. See H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-11, 20-26 (1961), for the chronology of some cases of extensive delay.
11 See H.R. REP. No. 1086, supra note 9, at 22-23. As an additional means of
combating delay, Congress provided in section 106(c) that "no petition for review or
for habeas corpus shall be entertained if the validity of the order has been previously
determined in any civil or criminal proceeding, unless the petition presents grounds
which the court finds could not have been presented in such prior proceeding, or the
court finds that the remedy provided by such prior proceeding was inadequate or
ineffective to test the validity of the order." 75 Stat. 653 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c)
(Supp. III, 1962).
1275 Stat 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. §1105a(a) (Supp. III, 1962). On §106, see
generally Note, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Con-
gress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760 (1962).
13 Ramasauskas v. Flagg, 309 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Schoeler v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 306 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1962); Dentico v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 303 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1962).
'4 Roumeliotis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 304 F.2d 453 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 921 (1962), and Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962),
hold that denials of discretionary relief are "ancillary" to the finding of deportability
and are therefore final and reviewable under section 106(a). The Ninth Circuit in
one case assumed that suspension orders were within the statute. Fong v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1962). However, the same court
has recently cited the instant case with approval while holding that denials of with-
holding of deportation under section 243(h) of the act, 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
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The court in the present case held that section 106(a) applies only to
orders required by statute to be made in a section 242(b) hearing-that is,
findings of deportability. 15 It rejected 16 the argument that Congress knew
that the suspension issue, pursuant to an administrative regulation, was also
determined in the 242 (b) hearing, and therefore intended section 106(a) to
apply to denials of suspension.17 The court contended that the words "final
orders of deportation" are used several times in sections 242 and 244, where
they clearly mean only the final ruling on deportability, and have become a
"term of art" in deportation law.' 8 This conclusion is questionable since
sections 242 and 244 do not represent an attempt to define the words "final
orders of deportation" for the purposes of the entire Immigration and
Nationality Act. As used in section 242, these words refer to the final ruling
on deportability only because that section was intended to provide the exclu-
sive procedure for the administrative determination of deportability. In
section 244 they were used only to set one of the eligibility requirements for
suspension-that the alien has not been served with an order requiring him
to be deported. It does not necessarily follow that they must be construed
to have the same meaning in a section enacted almost a decade later and con-
cerned with a different problem-judicial review.
The court found additional support for its holding in section 106(a)
(4)'s requirement that the petition for review by the court of appeals of
final orders of deportation must be "determined solely upon the administra-
tive record upon which the deportation order is based and the Attorney
General's findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive
... ,, '9 Prior to the enactment of section 106, suspension orders could
be based upon matter extrinsic to the record,2 0 were not required to be
based upon substantial evidence, and would be upheld unless they were arbi-
trary 2 ' The court argued, therefore, that in the absence of clear statutory
language it could not conclude that Congress intended denials of suspension
to be "final orders of deportation" reviewable under section 106 since the
requirement of section 106(a) (4) that the orders be based solely upon sub-
stantial evidence in the record would then apply.2 2 Although there is con-
siderable force to this argument, section 106(a) (4) can reasonably be con-
§ 1253 (h) (1958), are not directly reviewable. Holz v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 309 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1962) ; accord, as to denials of withholding, Zupicich v.
Esperdy, 207 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). However, in Kelch v. Kennedy, 209
F. Supp. 416 (D. Md. 1962), the court held that a refusal to extend the time for
voluntary departure was reviewable under section 106(a).
15 Instant case at 783.
161d. at 782-83.
'7 See Brief for Respondent, pp. 7-9.
18 Instant case at 781-82.
19 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (4) (Supp. III, 1962).
2o Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
21 United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957) ; United
States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (7d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, C.J.).
22 Instant case at 787-88.
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strued so that denials of suspension are directly reviewable by the courts of
appeals without disturbing existing law on the scope of review. Since the
special inquiry officer has no power to exercise his discretion to suspend
deportation until he finds an alien statutorily eligible for suspension,23 his
finding of eligibility and exercise of discretion may be considered distinct
acts.24 The finding of eligibility involves questions of fact and law,2 5 and
section 106 (a) (4) may be read to require that this finding be based upon
substantial evidence in the record. 20 However, the special inquiry officer's
exercise of discretion may still be held reviewable under the old test-
whether the denial of suspension was arbitrary. Courts previously made
such a distinction between the eligibility finding and the exercise of discre-
tion.27 Moreover, section 242(b) (4) 28 itself has always required that the
finding of deportability be based upon substantial evidence in the record.
Consequently, section 106(a) (4) may be viewed as merely a restatement
of prior law on scope of review. This does not mean that the section is
superfluous, but only that its purpose was to emphasize that the courts of
appeals are to use the existing standards of review under the new procedure.
This analysis indicates that the statutory words lend themselves to sev-
eral tenable but not wholly satisfactory interpretations. In this situation
the issue in the present case is best resolved by a consideration of the pur-
pose of section 106, to accelerate the deportation of undesirable aliens by
precluding successive dilatory appeals. 29 Although deportability and sus-
pension are determined in the same hearing, the court's holding means that
an alien may test only the deportability finding by direct appeal to the court
of appeals and must seek review of the denial of suspension in the district
court. The court argued, however, that such bifurcation would not occur
often enough to permit it to "take . . . liberties with the language of
§ 106(a)," 30 since most aliens 3 1 concede deportability and only seek review
of the denial of suspension. Furthermore, the court thought that when de-
portability is conceded, deportation would be expedited by review in the
23 Emanuel, Discretionary Relief From Deportation and Adjustment of Status,
in N.Y.U. CONFERENCE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT 65, 67 (Sellin ed. 1954); see Immigration and Nationality Act
§244(a), 66 Stat. 214 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a) (Supp. 1963).
24 See McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950); Fong v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1962); Pagano v. Brownell, 227 F.2d
36 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
2 5 For example, the question of whether or not the alien has been continuously
present in the United States for ten years since the commission of the deportable act
is a question of fact in most cases. Whether or not he is a person of good moral
character is usually a question of law. See 76 Stat. 1247 (1962), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254
(a) (2) (Supp. 1963).
26 Cf. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 352 (1956) (dictum).
2 7 See, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra.
28 66 Stat. 210 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (1958).
29 See generally H.R. REP. No. 1086, stpra note 9.
0 Instant case at 784.
31 Deportability is conceded in about 80% of the cases. GORDON & ROSENFD,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 5.7a, at 541.
19631
1230 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111
district court rather than in the court of appeals. 2 Unless the district court
grants a temporary restraining order, the Attorney General can moot the
proceedings in that court by deporting the alien. In contrast, if direct re-
view in the court of appeals is sought, section 106(a) (3) 3 provides for an
automatic stay of deportation unless the court directs otherwise. The court
assumed that stay orders are rarely granted by the district courts in actions
to review discretionary orders and that the alien is usually deported pen-
dente lite. Yet the general counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service has stated that the Service's policy is to stay deportation when a
petition to review the deportation proceedings is not "patently frivolous,"
and, consequently, that temporary restraining orders are usually unneces-
sary.34  He also maintained that the courts have exercised care to assure
aliens an opportunity to obtain judicial review? 5 In any event, even as-
suming that the court's factual assumptions are correct, the bifurcation prob-
lem remains in the cases that prompted section 106, for an alien seeking
delay can now obtain an automatic stay under section 106(a) (3) by seeking
review of deportability in the court of appeals and can also seek district
court review of denials of discretionary relief. To this extent, the con-
gressional plan of providing a unitary form of review will fail.
A further indication of congressional intent can be gleaned from a col-
loquy between Representatives Lindsay and Walter-the sponsor of the
bill-during the 1959 House debate 36 on an identically worded predecessor
of the bill that became section 106. In an effort to clarify the operation of
the six months statute of limitations on review in section 106(a) (1) ,7
Mr. Lindsay inquired as to the meaning of the words "final deportation
order." Mr. Walter assured him that although section 106(a) (1) states
2 See instant case at 784.
33 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (Supp. III, 1962).
34 Letter From L. Paul Winings, General Counsel of the Immigration & Nat-
uralization Service, to the University of Pennsylvania; Law Review, Feb. 7, 1963.
35 Ibid.
26 105 CONG. REc. 12728 (1959):
[MR. LINDSAY:]
I would suggest that we make sure that the history of this is absolutely
clear, that if there is any remedy on the administrative level left of any nature,
that the deportation order will not be considered final.
MR. WALTER:
That is correct. The final order means the final administrative order.
MR. LINDSAY:
A moment ago I asked . . . [Mr. Walter] whether or not . . . the 6
months' period would . . . begin to run until after the exhaustion of all
administrative remedies. In my question I assumed that suspension of
deportation would be included as an administrative remedy.
MR. WALTER :
[T]he 6 months' period on the question of finality of an order applies to
the final administrative adjudication of the applications for suspension of
deportation just as it would apply to any other issue brought up in deportation
proceedings.
3775 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. §1105a(a)(1) (Supp. III, 1962).
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that the six months period starts to run "from the date of the final deporta-
tion order," this would not occur until the final administrative adjudication
of the application for suspension. The court interpreted this colloquy to
mean that a suspension application tolls the six months review period and
that the ruling on deportability is still the only "final order of deportation"
reviewable under section 106(a) y 8 However, this colloquy is also open to
the interpretation that a denial of suspension is also a "final order of de-
portation" within that section. Moreover, in view of the cases in which a
delaying alien will appeal both the deportability and suspension rulings, the
court's assertion that the application for suspension tolls the running of the
six months period on the finding of deportability is unpersuasive. Since that
ruling does not become final until the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms
its validity, which it will do at the same time that it reviews the denial of
suspension. Rather than leaving open opportunities for delay, the court
could have better effectuated the congressional purpose by construing sec-
tion 106 to mean that the time limit will begin to run after full administrative
adjudication of the deportability and suspension issues and that both rulings
will be reviewed together by the court of appeals, unless the validity of the
deportability ruling is conceded, in which event the denial of suspension will
be reviewed alone.3 9
The court argued, however, that there is equal opportunity for delay
when an alien seeks review of the Attorney General's refusal to exercise his
discretionary power under section 243(h) 40 "to withhold deportation of
any alien . . . to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to physical persecution . . . . " Since section 106(a) applies only
to "final orders of deportation . . . made . . . pursuant to administra-
tive proceedings under section 242(b) . . . ," and at the time of the en-
actment of section 106 (a), withholding orders were not made in the 242 (b)
hearing, the court maintained that they cannot be held reviewable under
section 106(a).41 The court concluded that no logical distinction could be
drawn between a refusal of withholding and a denial of suspension-both
38 Instant case at 786-87.
39 The court argued that Congress could not have meant to require a three-judge
panel, in the first instance, to review discretionary orders because of the very limited
scope of the review. Instant case at 782. However, in view of the congressional
purpose of eliminating delays from the deportation process, it seems less desirable
to introduce the delay inherent in bifurcating judicial review of the deportability and
suspension rulings in order that the suspension ruling can be reviewed by one district
court judge instead of three circuit court judges.
It is conceivable that the present decision might be limited to cases in which
deportability is conceded and review only of discretionary orders is sought. In this
event, the district court would have jurisdiction over the discretionary orders, and
no bifurcation would occur. When, however, an alien seeks review of deportability
as well as denials of discretionary relief, the court of appeals might review the latter
as issues ancillary to the deportability issue.
40 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1958).
4 1 Instant case at 785; accord, Holz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 309
F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Zupicich v. Esperdy, 207 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Contra, Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962).
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rulings are equally final because their effect is that the alien will be deported
-and thus the denial of suspension is also not within section 106(a) .42
Again the court's reasoning does not prove that Congress meant to ex-
dude suspension rulings but only that section 106 was a poorly drafted
attempt to provide a unitary review procedure.
If section 106(a) were interpreted to require exclusive review by the
court of appeals only of those final orders which were made in the 242(b)
hearing at the time of the enactment of section 106(a), both major rulings
of the special inquiry officer-the finding of deportability and the ruling on
suspension-could be reviewed in one proceeding after full exhaustion of
administrative remedies. A more complete solution of the problem of pro-
viding a unitary review of deportation orders will require congressional
revision of this unsatisfactory statute.
INCOME TAX-$27 Ix BOOT INVALTDATES "B" RE RGANIZATION
X, a publicly held corporation, agreed to transfer some of its voting
stock in exchange for all of the shares of certain smaller companies. The
agreement contemplated a stock-for-stock exchange, prevalued the shares
of X at $14 each, and provided for a cash payment only in the event that
the determined value of the acquired corporations' stock was not evenly
divisible by that amount. In return for their interests in the acquired cor-
porations, taxpayers received voting shares of X valued at $27,914.50 plus
$27.36 in cash. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that
the taxpayers had realized a recognizable gain on the exchange equal to the
value received less the adjusted tax basis of the stock given up, and ac-
cordingly assessed a deficiency of $10,527.50. Taxpayers contended that
their receipt of cash was subject to a de minimis rule and that the scheme
of exchange constituted a valid stock-for-stock reorganization, as defined
in section 368(a) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code,, which requires
that acquired corporations receive "solely" voting shares of the acquiring
corporation. They claimed, therefore, that any gain realized, except to the
extent of the "boot," or cash,2 was "tax-free" under the nonrecognition
4 2 Instant case at 785.
1 [The term "reorganization" means] the acquisition by one corporation,
in exchange solely for all or part of its voting stock, of stock of another
corporation if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation
has control of such other corporation (whether or not such acquiring cor-
poration had control immediately before the acquisition) ....
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §368(a) (1) (B).
2 Section 356(a) (1) permits the receipt of property other than stock or securities
in an exchange which would otherwise qualify under § 354(a) (1). Gain is recognized
to the extent of any such "other property" received by the taxpayer. The so-called
"boot" provision is not applicable unless § 354 or § 355 is first applicable to the ex-
change.
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provisions of section 354(a). 3 In rejecting this argument, a divided Tax
Court held that Congress intended section 368(a) (1) (B) to be construed
literally and that "solely" left no room for even a de minimis transfer of
boot, or "other" property. The taxpayers had thus failed to enter into a
reorganization, a prerequisite to nonrecognition under section 354(a),4 and
their gain was recognizable to the extent realized. Six dissenting judges
argued, however, that "solely" meant only that there could be no considera-
tion other than voting stock. They contended that the $27 in boot was
not an "impelling influence" which induced the taxpayers to enter the con-
tract and therefore was not consideration. 5 Richard M. Mills, 39 T.C. No.
36 (1962).
In construing "solely" in a context similar to that of section 368(a)
(1) (B), the Supreme Court held in Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp.,6
a case involving a "C" reorganization with $106,680 of boot, that "'solely'
leaves no leeway. Voting stock plus some other consideration does not
meet the statutory requirement." 7 This holding was relied upon by the
Second Circuit to reject a contention that a "B" reorganization was effected
when cash constituted seventeen percent of the property received by the
acquired corporation.8 But in a subsequent Seventh Circuit case, Howard
v. Commissioner,9 taxpayers successfully avoided the rigors of Southwest
by hypothesizing that the questioned acquisition comprised two component
events-a "B" reorganization in which the acquiring corporation received
80 percent, or control as defined by the 1939 Code's version of section
368(c),1O° of the stock of the acquired corporation in exchange solely for
3 IN GFNzaRA.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities
in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan
of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation
or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 354(a) (1).
4 Section 368 has no direct tax effect and is definitional only. To postpone the
recognition of income under § 354 the taxpayer must enter into a § 368 "reorganization."
The court reasoned that the transfer of property other than voting stock was enough
to take any purported reorganization outside the § 368 definitions and therefore that
the taxpayers could not possibly come within § 354 or the boot provisions of § 356.
5 Essentially this is the argument made by the Ninth Circuit in Stockton Harbor
Indus. Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 904 (1955), in which the court said that only property transferred "one for the
other" will be considered part of the exchange contemplated by the Code.
Three judges concurred on the ground that a sale rather than a corporate
reformation had been consummated. Instant case at 11.
6315 U.S. 194 (1942).
7 Id. at 198.
8 Commissioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 681 (1942). See also Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Commissioner, 3 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 868 (1944), af'd per curiam, 152 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 838 (1946); Central Kan. Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 213 (10th
Cir. 1944).
9 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956).
10 "[C]ontrol" means the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and
at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock
of the corporation.
INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c).
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voting stock, and a separate exchange of cash for the remaining shares out-
standing. The Tax Court had ruled that because of the boot, the transac-
tion was not a "B" reorganization and that the gain was recognizable. 1
The Seventh Circuit agreed that a "B" reorganization must be solely stock-
for-stock, but held that there need not be an actual qualifying reorganization
before the boot provisions of what is now section 356(a) become operative.
The taxpayers' gain was recognizable, therefore, only to the extent of the
boot.1 2  However, when the Tax Court later relied on the Seventh Cir-
cuit's Howard analysis,13 it was reversed by the Ninth Circuit.' 4 In affirm-
ing, the Supreme Court, in Turnbow v. Commjssioner,15 refused to permit
the hypothetical separation of components condoned by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Howard and concluded that the boot provisions were unavailable
unless the entire transaction met the definition of reorganization set forth in
the 1939 Code's version of section 368 (a) (1).16 Turnbow clearly indicates
that the boot provisions of section 356 are inapplicable unless there has been
an actual reorganization, as defined in section 368. It does not, however,
necessarily control the present case.17 As the Supreme Court recognized, 8
Turnbow presented an extreme factual situation-the boot amounted to
11 Hubert E. Howard, 24 T.C. 792 (1955).
12 The Howard case is significant for another reason. The Commissioner was
not attempting to tax the gain realized on the shift in corporate interest, but to
prevent the taxpayer from "tacking" the holding period of the stock given up to the
holding period of the stock received for capital gains purposes. Section 1223(1),
dealing with the holding period of property for purposes of capital gains treatment,
permits "tacking" when the property received in the exchange has the same basis,
in the hands of the taxpayer, as the property given up. The Commissioner argued
that the taxpayer had received the property in a taxable exchange so that the basis
of the new stock was the market value and not the tax basis of the property given up.
'1 Grover D. Turnbow, 32 T.C. 646 (1959).
14 Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1960).
15 368 U.S. 337 (1961).
16 The relevant provisions of the 1939 and 1954 Codes are essentially the same,
except that the 1954 Code permits the acquiring corporation to gain the necessary
80% control in stages rather than all at once. The present case marks the first time
that the issue concerning boot in a "B" reorganization has been raised under the
1954 Code.
17 Significantly, Turnbow did not determine whether a valid "B" reorganization
might exist once 80% of the stock of the acquired corporation had been exchanged
for voting stock of the acquiring corporation, irrespective of any hypothetical sepa-
ration of taxable components. Such an approach has not been adopted in any case,
see Kanter, Boot of $27 Kills B-type Reorganization: De Minimis Rule Does Not
Apply, 18 J. TAXATION 138, 140 (1963), and the present decision implicitly rejects it.
However, at least one authority has urged its validity. See Merritt, Tax-Free
Corporate Acquisitions-The Law and the Proposed Regulations, 53 MIcHa. L. REv.
911, 928, 929 (1955). See generally Kanter, supra.
'5 [I]nasmuch as § 112(g) (1) (B) [now §368(a) (1) (B)] defines "reor-
ganization" to mean "the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely
for all or a part of its voting stock, of at least 80 per centum of the . . .
stock of another corporation," an exchange of stock and cash-approxi-
mately 30 per centum in stock and 70 per centum in cash-for "at least 80
per centum of the . . . stock of another corporation" cannot be a "reorgani-
zation," as defined in § 112 (g) (1) (B), nor hence of "stock . . . in . . . a
party to a reorganization" as required by § 112(b) (3) [now §354(a)], and
thus § 112(c) (1) [now § 356(a)] cannot be applicable to petitioner's trans-
action. That holding determines this case and is all we decide.
368 U.S. at 344.
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$3,000,000, or 70 percent of the consideration received. Even in Howard
the boot amounted to almost 20 percent. Thus, in both Turnbow and How-
ard the boot was plainly additional consideration for which the transferors
had bargained. In contrast, it is equally clear in the present case, as the
dissenters contended, 19 that the $27 was not bargained for in addition to the
voting stock of the acquiring corporation, but represented a payment in lieu
of fractional shares. To hold that such an exchange does not amount to a
"B" reorganization is to exalt form over substance in order to reach an
unreasonable and unnecessary result.
Even if the court of appeals follows the Tax Court's decision that a
de minimis amount of "boot" vitiates an attempted "B" reorganization, it
should not pose much of a problem for counsel planning "B" reorganiza-
tions in the future. There are numerous ways that the fractional share
problem can be handled so as to eliminate the need for boot 20 In particu-
lar, there is Tax Court authority that so long as the entire consideration
moving from the acquiring corporation is qualifying voting stock, the ac-
quired corporation can legitimately make certain arrangements to compen-
sate its stockholders for the fractional shares they would otherwise have
received.2
The real significance of the present decision appears to be its implica-
tions for recognition of losses in future reorganizations. The nonrecogni-
tion provisions of section 354(a) permit the tax deferral of "paper gain" 
realized in a genuine corporate reorganization. Consistent with postponing
the taxation of "paper gain," the Code requires the deferral of "paper loss,"
so that a mere change in the form of a taxpayer's corporate interest will
have no immediate effect on taxable income.P But as a consequence of the
rationale advanced in the present case, a taxpayer who has suffered a "paper
loss," even though in substance having entered into a "B" reorganization,
may avoid the nonrecognition of loss requirement of section 35 4(a) by
electing to receive a relatively insignificant quantum of boot. The taxpayer
19 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
2 0 The Internal Revenue Service has allowed an acquiring corporation to issue
fractional shares which it later repurchased from the former shareholders of the
acquired corporation. Shareholders have also been permitted to pay the additional
cash necessary to purchase a full share. See Merritt, supra note 17, at 934-35. In
addition, the Service has sanctioned the issuance of scrip, redeemable for full shares,
in lieu of fractional shares. See Rev. Rul. 55-59, 1955-1 Gum. BULL. 35. The pay-
ment of a small amount of cash in place of fractional shares or redeemable scrip
should not lead to a different result. See Rubenfeld, Handle Expenses, Fractional
Shares, Escrows, i. Reorganization With Great Care, 15 J. TAXATION 66, 67 (1961).
21 See Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842 (1945). See also Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13
T.C. 399 (1949); Westfir Lumber Co., 7 T.C. 1014 (1946); Peabody Hotel Co.,
7 T.C. 600 (1946) ; Ernest F. Becher, 22 T.C. 932, 940 (1954) (dictum).
22 "Paper gain" denotes gain realized only because the taxpayer has given up
property with a market value higher than its basis in his hands, which value is
imputed to the property received, creating a gain, although nothing has actually
changed but the form of the property held.
2 See Treas. Regs. § 1.368-1(b) (1955); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1934), expressing approbation of the Supreme Court's line of decisions
allowing the nonrecognition of gain in corporate reorganizations which result only
in a shift in the form of the taxpayer's interest.
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is thereby placed in a position where he can determine 354(a)'s applicability
by means of a trifling formality.2 4 This interpretation seems to comport
with the tax bar's present understanding of the statute,25 although not with
the spirit of the 1934 amendments to the reorganization provisions of the
Revenue Act, which were enacted in part, to invalidate a tax avoidance
device that enabled taxpayers to recognize loss on transactions that in sub-
stance were reorganizations by the receipt of a small amount of boot.
2 6
At this time, almost thirty years after the introduction of the "B"
reorganization, it is not suggested that the courts necessarily initiate a line
of decisions to offset the rigidity of section 368(a) (1) (B) which now per-
mits the kind of tax manipulation suggested above. But congressional action
clearly seems appropriate. "C" reorganizations differ from "B" reorganiza-
tions only in that the acquiring corporation receives substantially all of the
assets of the acquired corporation rather than a controlling interest in stock.
Yet in the 1954 Code Congress amended the definition of the "C" reorgan-
ization to allow the receipt of a limited quantity of boot.27 The reason for
this amendment was a congressional desire to provide for the situation in
which a minority of recalcitrant stockholders might otherwise block a pro-
24 In construing § 332, dealing with the nonrecognition of gain or loss in inter-
corporate liquidations when the parent company holds at least 80% of the stock of
a subsidiary corporation, the courts have always permitted the parent to make bona
fide sale of the subsidiary's stock immediately prior to a planned liquidation even
though the express purpose of such sale is to avoid the nonrecognition of loss require-
ment of § 332 by reducing the parent's holdings of subsidiary stock below 80%. See
Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956) (sale two weeks
before the proposed liquidation); Commissioner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 151
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945) (sale to corporation treasurer) ; Avco Mfg. Corp., 25 T.C.
975 (1956). However, it seems clear that the predecessor of § 332 was enacted as
a boon to holding companies compelled to simplify their corporate structure by the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. §79 (1958),
and that Congress has recognized its elective nature. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1954).
25 See Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Advisory
Group Recommetndation on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1959) (discussing recognition of gains). (Hereinafter
cited as Hearings.)
26 The "B" reorganization was introduced in the aftermath of a congressional
proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions of the Code because of the wide-
spread tax avoidance which they facilitated. See House WAYS AND MENas SUB-
COMM., PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1933). Although
Congress decided, for reasons of sound economic policy, not to eliminate completely
the corporate reorganization provisions, it made drastic changes in those provisions
"to stop the known cases of tax avoidance." See H.R. RE,. No. 704, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1934). The Tax Court in the present case construed this legislative
history as indicating that Congress intended to create an elective provision. Instant
case at 8-9. In particular, the court observed that "Congress enacted the predecessor
of section 368(a) (1) (B) to allow taxpayers to choose nonrecognition of gain or
loss by literal compliance therewith or to choose recognition of gain or loss by
deviation slightly therefrom. Any other interpretation would turn that section into
a guessing game." Id. at 8. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Howard v. Com-
missioner, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956), viewed the possibility that recognition of
paper loss would be facilitated as a reason for rejecting the Commissioner's con-
tention that the boot provisions of the 1939 analogue of section 356(a) were only
applicable if the purported reorganization qualified under the 1939 analogue of section
368(a). In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit also resorted to legislative
history. Id. at 948.
27 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (2) (B).
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posed reorganization by demanding property rather than stock in the "con-
tinuing corporation" in return for their shares&8  There seems to be no
reason why the amendment should not have been extended to "B" reor-
ganizations. In fact, the Sub-chapter C Advisory Group Revised Report to
Congress in 1958 suggested that the "solely" requirement for both "B" and
"C" reorganizations be altered to require that no more than two-thirds of
the consideration given up by the acquiring corporation need be stock of
that corporation.2 9 Congress has failed to act on this problem, but logic
compels that it harmonize the requirements for "B" and "C" reorgan-
izations.30
LABOR LAW-EMPLoYER NEED NOT PRODUCE DATA REQUESTED
BY UNioN WHEN DETERMINATION OF TH:E RELEVANCE OF THE DATA
REQUmES RESOLUTION OF ARBITRABLE IssuE
Employer demoted two employees allegedly because of a lack of work
in their regular department. Pursuant to the procedures of the collective
bargaining agreement, the union filed a grievance claiming that the de-
motions contravened the agreement. Shortly thereafter the union re-
quested data regarding hours and job assignments to determine whether
there really was a lack of work. In refusing the request, the employer
claimed that the matter was not subject to the grievance procedure because
the management's prerogative clause of the bargaining agreement gave it
absolute authority to determine the existence of lack of work. It admitted,
however, that the interpretation of the clause was arbitrable, and offered to
furnish relevant data if the arbitrator decided that availability of work was
28 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
29 See Hearings at 473, 554. The Advisory Group thought that the stock received
from the acquiring corporation need not be "voting stock" as required under present
law, as long as a continuing economic interest is maintained. Ibid. This approach
has been attacked on the ground that it permits the acquiring corporation to exchange
nonvoting preferred shares, which are the "financial equivalent' of debentures, and
therefore the stockholders of the acquired corporation would not have a continuing
interest after they gave up their common stock. See Calkins, Corporate Distributions
and Adjustments and the Hard Road to a Broader Tax Base, 3 TAx REVISION
COMPENDIUM, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1631, 1636 (Comm. Print
1959).30 The reasoning of the Tax Court in the instant case exemplifies the way in
which courts have strayed from the original congressional intent to distinguish be-
tween the sale of a corporate interest and a corporate reformation for tax purposes.
See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Section 368(a) (1) (B) is an
implementation of the judicial "continuity of interest?' doctrine, see Helvering v.
Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942), under which a transaction will
not qualify as a "reorganization! even though it literally complies with the language
of the act unless it represents merely a change in the form of a taxpayer's corporate
interest without an attendant change in the nature or extent of that interest. See
Treas. Regs. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
In the present case the taxpayers relinquished an entrepreneurial interest in several
small businesses for an investment interest in a large publicly held corporation. In
any real sense they no longer held the same interest that they had possessed prior to
the exchange; they had changed from owners to investors. But the Tax Court,
consistent with the traditional judicial attitude toward similar corporate exchanges,
seemed oblivious to the apparent contradiction with the original congressional intent.
In the absence of some new indication from Congress it seems likely that the judiciary
will continue to handle similar situations in the same manner.
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not for sole determination by the employer. The union bypassed arbitra-
tion and filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging
that employer's action was a refusal to bargain in good faith contrary to
sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.
1 The
Board sustained the union's contentions, 2 but because the union's right to
the information depended upon the prior resolution of an arbitrable issue,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Rives, J., dissenting, refused to
enforce the Board's order. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569
(5th Cir. 1962).
The duty to bargain collectively 3 obligates an employer to comply
with a union's request for wage data and related information about em-
ployees in the appropriate unit to aid the union in bargaining for a new
agreement or in administering grievances under an existing one.
4 A
union may, however, bargain away its right to obtain certain information
by acceding to a management's prerogative clause, which places enumerated
matters exclusively in the hands of the employer.5 If a dispute arises as
to the scope of such a clause, a collective bargaining agreement which in-
corporates grievance procedures ending in binding arbitration affords an
ideal method of settlement. 6 Significantly, the NLRA states that "Final
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agree-
ment." 7 Moreover, Congress left the enforcement of such dispute-settling
procedures to the "usual processes of the law" by expressly refusing to
make breaches of collective bargaining contracts unfair labor practices,
8
and recent Supreme Court decisions have ensured that legal processes are
1 National Labor Relations Act §§8(a) (1), (5), 49 Stat. 452, 453 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (5) (1958) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].2 Sinclair Ref. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1660 (1961). The case was decided by a
three-member panel pursuant to the provisions of § 3 (b) of the NLRA, as amended,
61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (Supp. III, 1962).
3 [T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer . . . to meet. . . and confer in good faith with "respect to . . .
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder ....
NLRA § 8(d), added by 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958) ; see NLRB
v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1939).
4 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 917 (1956); Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforced
per curiam, 217 F.72d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); NLRB
v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953) (per curiam). The reason for the
rule is to enable the union better to fulfill its statutory duty to represent the employees
by being able to bargain on an informed basis.
- Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952); cf. Avco Mfg. Corp., 111 N.L.R.B.
729 (1955). A waiver of the right to obtain certain data must clearly appear in the
contract itself or the antecedent negotiations. See NLRB v. Gulf Atl. Warehouse
Co., 291 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176, 178-79
(2d Cir. 1953) (per curiam).
6 It is not an unfair labor practice to insist that the contract procedures be
followed. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947);
cf. NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 196 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1952).
7NLRA §203(d), added by 61 Stat. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §173(d) (1958).
8 Instant case at 575-76; H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947).
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adequate to enforce arbitration agreements.9 Although its power to deal
with unfair labor practices cannot be limited by private agreements,'
0 the
Board has generally declined to interfere with established grievance and
arbitration procedures 11 except when necessary to protect rights guar-
anteed by the act.' 2
The controversy surrounding the right of the union in the present
case to obtain information on lack of work involved an interpretation of a
management's prerogative clause which provided both that management
had the sole prerogative to determine lack of work and that the clause
would not be used to discriminate against union members.13 The extent
to which the company had discretion to determine lack of work was there-
fore a matter of contract interpretation. It is significant, however, that
any decision by the company concerning lack of work could also involve
other matters in the contract which were not in management's sole dis-
cretion, such as the prohibition against working employees outside their
classifications and the NLRA guarantee against discrimination, which were
incorporated into the agreement.' 4 It is unlikely that the parties intended
to permit violations of these other clauses to go unchallenged simply because
management invoked the "lack of work" label. Nevertheless, the extent
of the union's access to the information and the procedure it would have
to follow to get it were matters of contract interpretation. Despite the
company's good faith assertion that the interpretation issue was for the
arbitrator, the Board itself decided the issue, holding that the company
mistakenly had equated "lack of work" with "alleged lack of work," and
that the union could not have intended to give the company a convenient
disguise for discriminatory personnel action.' 5
Although the present case is an exception, the Board has usually
taken the position that it will not act on an alleged unfair labor practice
involving an arbitrable issue of contract interpretation until that issue has
) In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Court held
that under section 301 (a) of the NLRA a district court can properly decree specific
performance of an arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
In the Steelworkers cases--United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Na.v Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)-the
Court, in defining the scope of judicial inquiry in suits to compel arbitration or to
enforce arbitration awards, indicated that while the courts should determine whether
or not a controversy is arbitrable, they should not rule on its merits or disturb an
arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement.
1o NLRA § 10(a), as amended, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
11 See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), in which the Board refused
to disturb the arbitrator's findings when the proceedings were fair and regular, and
both parties had agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision; Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951), in which the Board refused to enter a remedial order
against the employer's unilateral action when the union failed to utilize the grievance
and arbitration procedures agreed to in the contract.
12Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961); Vogue Lingerie, Inc., 123
N.L.R.B. 1009, 1010 (1959), modified, 280 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1960); see, e.g., NLRB
v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 297 F.2d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Walt Disney
Prods., 146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945).
't Instant case at 571 n.4.
'4 See Address by Gerald A. Brown, Seventh Annual Southeastern Conference
on Current Trends in Collective Bargaining, Nov. 7, 1962, at 9.
15 132 N.L.R.B. at 1661-62.
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been arbitrated.16 In Hercules Motor Corp.,17 decided subsequent to the
order of the three-man Board in the present case but prior to the decision
of the court of appeals, the full Board, in an analogous factual situation, re-
fused to enter the controversy until after the union had resorted to the
arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. To
have done otherwise would have lessened the effectiveness of those pro-
cedures 18 and undercut the congressional policy of encouraging voluntary
settlement of grievance disputes.19  Nevertheless, the Board in the
present case sanctioned such a course of conduct by the union. The
different result in Hercules seems explicable only in terms of the clarity
of the contract interpretation issue: in Hercules the Board apparently
thought that there was a substantial question of contract interpretation;
in the present case, however, it seemed to think that the disputed language
could bear only one tenable construction.2 °
16 See Hercules Motor Corp., 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962) ; National Dairy Prods.
Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 434 (1960); United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955).17 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962).
18 The Board said that,
If, instead of requiring the Union in this case to give "full play" to the
grievance procedure, we were to permit the facilities provided by the Act to
be used in avoidance of the bargaining agreement, we would be frustrating
the Act's policy of promoting industrial stabilization through collective bar-
gaining agreements.
50 L.R.R.M. at 1023. (Footnote omitted.)
'9 See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-04 (1952). See
generally cases cited note 9, mpra. Under the terms of the grievance machinery
in the present case the grievance must reach the arbitrators within 153 days after
filing. By the date of decision of the court of appeals, over two years had passed
since the inception of the dispute. Instant case at 578. The present decision, however,
does not eliminate all delay. When the employer refuses to supply data pertinent to
a grievance on the ground that the grievance is not cognizable under the contract,
it will be necessary for the union to suspend action on that grievance and file a new
grievance to get the issue of contract interpretation before the arbitrators. If the
arbitrators decide in favor of the union on that issue, the union can then continue the
original grievance.
20 See 132 N.L.R.B. at 1662. Hercules was decided eight months after the Board
decision in Sinclair; the three-man panel in Sinclair was in the majority in Hercules.
Because of the failure to mention Sinclair and the short time span between the two
cases, it seems unlikely that members of the Sinclair panel changed their views and
in Hercules meant tacitly to overrule their decision in Sinclair. The difference in
result can be explained on the ground that the discrimination issue stressed by Judge
Rives in Sinclair, see his dissenting opinion at 579, was apparently not present in
Hercules. As Member Brown has since noted,
Even if the company in Sinclair were correct in its contention that the contract
reserved to the company the unilateral power to decide that lack of work
justified changes in tenure, such information also would relate to action which
might have contravened other provisions of the contract. Thus, the union
alleged that there had been violations of two other contract clauses which
prohibited the company from working employees outside their classifications
and discriminating against union members both of which were dearly arbi-
trable. Accordingly, the information was essential to enable the union to
determine whether grievances with respect to these latter provisions should
be pursued through the contract procedures.
Address by Gerald A. Brown, supra note 14, at 9. This relation between lack of
work and clearly grievable matters such as discrimination makes it apparent that
the parties could not have meant to adopt the construction of the management's
prerogative clause now being contended for by the company. In contrast, in Hercules
the data sought by the union was not relevant to clearly grievable matters. It would
have been legally relevant only if the contract interpretation issue immediately in
dispute was resolved in the union's favor. Ibid.
It should be noted, however, that the discrimination issue was not prominent
in the Sinclair Board proceedings. See note 26 infra.
RECENT CASES
The same considerations that lead the Board not to decide cases when
it finds a substantial question regarding interpretation of the agreement
should control whenever one of the parties in a case alleges in good faith
that an arbitrable question must be resolved prior to an unfair labor prac-
tice charge.21  The Board is naturally reluctant to delay a decision by
compelling the parties to submit a seemingly clear issue to arbitration, but
the delay only occurs because one of the parties failed to adhere to the
more expeditious grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the
contract.2 2 In addition, if the union in the present case can obtain data
regarding lack of work before the management's prerogative clause is
construed, not only would the arbitration procedures be undercut, but the
value of the management's prerogative clause would be impaired since the
union could obtain information relating to a matter that the contract may
have placed solely in the company's discretion. The Board in the present
case too quickly passed over the issue of contract interpretation and the
proper role of the Board in such matters. Even considering the Board's
powers under section 10(a) to disregard agreements to arbitrate when the
dispute involves an unfair labor practice,2 there could be no ruling on the
unfair labor practice charge until the interpretation issue had been re-
solved.2 4  The Board is not the appropriate forum in which to resolve
that issue.
Judge Rives in dissent took the position that, despite the manage-
ment's prerogative clause, the union had the right to obtain information in
order to ascertain whether the company was using "lack of work" to
conceal discriminatory demotions.2 5 Although the union's grievance in the
present case did not explicitly allege discrimination, and the union never
raised that issue with the company,26 Judge Rives argued that this failure
to allege discrimination was "both responsible and understandable, when
we consider that . . . [the union] did not have the information either
upon which it could base such charges or from which it could know that
such charges were untrue." 2 7  The union was entitled, in Judge Rives'
view, to all data that would enable it to evaluate a possible discrimination
21 Member Fanning, dissenting in Hercules, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1024, argued that
the majority's view would enable employers to assert frivolous claims that a grievance
was not cognizable in order to avoid or delay the production of data. On the other
hand, his position would require an employer to furnish data even when the employer
had a meritorious claim of non-cognizability.
22See note 19 supra.
2 See NLRA § 10(a), as amended, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1958).
24 See instant case at 575.
2zId. at 579 (dissenting opinion).
2 6 In its grievance statement and in subsequent correspondence with the company,
the union did not mention the discrimination issue. Appendix to Brief for Petitioner,
pp. 134-41. There was, however, some mention of discrimination before the Board.
132 N.L.R.B. at 1662 n.3; Brief for Respondents, p. 4 & n.5. The Board did not
argue that there had been any discrimination in this case. See Brief for Respondents.
It thought, however, that the company's interpretation, if accepted, would afford a
convenient disguise for illegitimate motives in taking future personnel action. 132
N.L.R.B. at 1661-62.2 7 1nstant case at 579 (dissenting opinion).
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grievance more intelligently; only with such information could the union
have determined the reasons for the demotions, and, if the reasons were
valid, the last step in the grievance procedure-arbitration-might never
be reached.
There are two explanations of the union's failure to file a grievance
explicitly charging discrimination. The first is that the union simply never
thought the demotions were discriminatory. The second is that suggested
by Judge Rives-that the union, although suspecting discrimination, was
reluctant to file a possibly groundless grievance that might incense the
union members and irritate management. While entitled to considerable
weight, this second reason seems insufficient, in the absence of the arbi-
trator's interpretation of the contract, to justify Judge Rives' broad view
of the employer's obligation to supply data. Such an interpretation should
come from the arbitrator, not from the NLRB or the courts.
Significantly, if the issue as to the interpretation of the management's
prerogative clause were submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator could reject both con-
structions advanced by the parties. Instead he could decide that the union
will have to allege discrimination with some specificity before the company
can be compelled to defend its finding of lack of work. This construction
would give the clause the effect desired by the company while still affording
the union some measure of protection from illegitimate use of the "lack
of work" label to disguise discriminatory personnel actions. Underlying
such a construction would be the arbitrator's conclusion that if the union
can force the company to release information every time a worker is
demoted or laid off for lack of work, the company would be deprived of a
right it thought it had secured through the management's prerogative
clause-the right to keep certain aspects of its operations free from union
scrutiny. However, even the court of appeals in the present case ap-
parently thought that the only standard the union had to meet in order
to acquire data on lack of work was the filing of a grievance containing a
bare allegation of discrimination. If the arbitrator were to agree, the
result would likely be a needless proliferation of discrimination charges by
the union in order to get information on lack of work. This factor leads
to the conclusion that the arbitrator will agree with the NLRB that the
company cannot unilaterally ascertain the existence of work without any
check on its good faith. The NLRB's interpretation would permit the
company to take action concerning lack of work without the necessity of
bargaining with the union on every layoff or demotion only if the union is
satisfied from its investigation of the relevant data that the company is not
trying to shield discriminatory motives.
Although the decision of the court of appeals intimates no opinion as
to the proper interpretation of the management's prerogative clause, the
procedure prescribed by the majority effectuates the agreement of the
parties and the congressional policy of encouraging arbitration of
grievances.
